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Highlights1
• Strategic reserves and capacity markets can improve the security 
of supply and contribute positively to consumer benefits if they 
are carefully conceived and managed.
• The presence of an interconnector may negatively affect the 
effectiveness of a capacity market, depending on the relative size 
of the interconnection and the degree to which the consumption 
peaks coincide. The capacity ‘leakage’ benefits the neighbouring 
market in terms of lower prices and higher reliability, but it may 
also lead to import dependency.
• A capacity market can crowd out generators in an interconnected 
energy-only zone. Hence, it may put pressure on neighbouring 
markets to implement a capacity mechanism as well.
• In case the neighbouring zone decides not to implement a capac-
ity market, a strategic reserve can also offset this crowding-out 
effect and thus lower the risk of investment cycles in generation 
capacity.
1.  is policy brief summarises the results of the publication “Cross-border e ects of capacity 
mechanisms in interconnected power systems” (2017) in Utilities Policy http://doi.org/10.1016/j.
jup.2017.03.005
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1. Introduction
 e growing penetration of intermittent renewable 
resources is leading to concerns regarding the secu-
rity of supply and generation adequacy in the Euro-
pean Union (EU).  ese concerns revive and add to 
the debate about the security of supply in electricity 
markets. Consequently, the debate is reopened in 
the remaining energy-only markets in Europe as to 
whether to implement a capacity (remuneration) 
mechanism, especially in the presence of variable 
renewable energy resources. 
In the EU, the decision of whether to implement a 
capacity mechanism and its design and implementa-
tion are le  to the discretion of the member states. 
In a highly interconnected system, such as the conti-
nental European electricity system, an apparent risk 
is that the uncoordinated implementation of capacity 
mechanisms could reduce economic e  ciency and 
even negatively a ect the security of supply in neigh-
bouring systems as has been discussed at length in 
literature. 
In our research, an agent-based model is utilised to 
analyse the e ectiveness of capacity mechanisms in 
interconnected systems.  e cross-border e ects on 
prices, investment and security of supply that they 
may cause in the long term are studied. We expand 
EMLAb-Generation1, an existing agent-based model 
of interconnected electricity markets, by modelling a 
strategic reserve and a capacity market. 
A strategic reserve can be implemented in diverse 
ways. In its simplest form, when a system operator 
implements a strategic reserve, he/she contracts and 
dispatches a certain volume of generation capacity, 
usually the generation units with the highest vari-
able costs.  is contracted capacity is then deployed 
when the electricity price exceeds an administra-
tively set ‘reserve price’ that is greater than the power 
plant’s marginal cost of generation but below the 
value of lost load. 
1.  www.emlab.tudelft.nl
In theory, the arti cial tightening of the supply due 
to the presence of a strategic reserve would attract 
investment in generation capacity before a physical 
shortage occurs. Consequently, the high price spikes 
that occur in periods of scarcity would be replaced 
by more frequent but also lower price spikes, capped 
at the reserve dispatch price. 
In a capacity market, consumers, or an agent on their 
behalf, are obligated to purchase capacity credits 
equivalent to the sum of their expected peak con-
sumption plus a reserve margin that is determined 
by the system operator or the regulator through a 
process of auctions. 
 e additional revenues from the capacity market 
are intended to ensure that (peaking) power plants 
recover their  xed costs and thus discourage any 
untimely decommissioning. A capacity requirement 
is also expected to provide an earlier and stronger 
investment signal than wholesale electricity prices 
and improve supply adequacy. It should be noted 
that a variety of capacity market designs have been 
implemented across the di erent electricity markets. 
2. Scenarios and indicators
 e scenarios used in our analysis consists of two 
identical markets (Zone A and Zone B) that are 
connected by an interconnector.  e reference sce-
nario (BL) consists of energy-only markets in both 
zones.  e remaining scenarios are permutations of 
capacity mechanism implementation as illustrated 
in Table 1. 
 Table 1: List of scenarios
Scenario Zone A Zone B
BL Energy-only Energy-only
SR-EO Strategic Reserve Energy-only
CM-EO Capacity Market Energy-only
CM-SR Capacity Market Strategic Reserve
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 e indicators that were used in the analysis of the 
results are:
1.  e shortage hours (hours/year): the number of 
hours per year with scarcity prices. 
2.  e average electricity price (€/MWh). 
3.  e cost of the capacity mechanism (€/MWh): 
the cost incurred by the consumers for con-
tracting the mandated capacity credits from the 
capacity market or for contracting generating 
units into the strategic reserve. 
4.  e cost to consumers (€/MWh): the sum of the 
electricity price, the cost of the capacity market, 
and the cost of the renewable policy (if appli-
cable) per unit of electricity consumed. 
5.  e supply ratio (MW/MW): the ratio of avail-
able supply at peak (MW) and peak demand 
(MW). 
 e quantitative results are presented in Figure 1.
6.  Cross-border e ects of a strategic 
reserve
In our research, implementation of a strategic 
reserve in one zone (Zone A) of an interconnected 
system improves the security of supply and net con-
sumer bene ts in that zone.  e bene ts also spill-
over to the neighbouring interconnected zone, both 
regarding reduction in shortage hours and reduction 
in costs to consumers. In the other zone (with an 
energy-only market - Zone B), no signi cant e ect 
on investment is observed – at least, in our experi-
mental setup with two equally-sized markets and a 
 xed interconnector size. 
We also compare these results to an isolated system 
(no interconnections) with a similarly sized stra-
tegic reserve. Part of the capacity from the zone with 
a strategic reserve is exported to the neighbouring 
market, as there is no restriction on exports. Con-
sequently, there are more shortage hours in the 
zone with the strategic reserve than in the isolated 
case, while the shortage hours in the neighbouring 
energy-only region are reduced. Hence, a strategic 
reserve has a similar positive external e ect upon 
neighbouring countries as a capacity market, but its 
investment dynamics are di erent. Again, the con-
sumers in Zone B may be considered to be free riding 
on the consumers in Zone A, and less interconnec-
tion would limit the e ect. A TSO that implements 
a strategic reserve would, therefore, experience an 
incentive to restrict exports, for example by limiting 
the volume of interconnector capacity that is made 
available to the market, during simultaneous power 
shortages in both zones.
Figure 1:  e percentage change in values of various indicators in Zone A (le ) and Zone B (right) on 
implementation of capacity mechanisms as compared to the baseline scenario (BL)
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7.  Cross-border e ects of a capacity 
market
In our research, if a capacity market is introduced 
in a zone that is interconnected with an energy-only 
market, the capacity market still achieves the ade-
quacy goals in the zone (Zone A) that implements it, 
at least in our experimental set-up with two equally-
sized markets. If the capacity market is small in com-
parison to its neighbour(s), we cannot exclude the 
possibility that the exports will reduce its e ective-
ness.  e supply ratio in the capacity market remains 
adequate, while the consumers in the interconnected 
market bene t from the additional capacity with 
lower prices and fewer shortages.  e free riding of 
the consumers in the interconnected energy-only 
market (Zone B) leads to a marginal increase in 
the cost to consumers of the region implementing 
a capacity market, but the overall consumer bene t 
improves.  e fact that the consumers in the zone 
without a capacity mechanism may be free riding on 
the consumers in the zone with a capacity mecha-
nism may create acceptability issues in the country 
with the capacity mechanism, where the consumers 
are paying more.
In our research, a capacity market suppresses invest-
ment in the interconnected zone (with an energy-
only market), which may make the neighbouring 
zone import dependent and may lead to an invest-
ment cycle there.  e leadership in the zone with an 
energy-only market may become concerned about 
the availability of electricity during power short-
ages and strive for su  cient domestic generation 
capacity to be able to meet demand without imports 
if necessary.  is may be a reason for implementing 
a capacity mechanism in the energy-only market 
zone as well. However, allowing (and facilitating) the 
cross-border trade of capacity credits might coun-
tervail the crowding-out of generation capacity in 
the neighbouring market. 
8. Cross-policy e ects due to the 
implementation of dissimilar capacity 
mechanisms 
If a capacity market and a strategic reserve are 
implemented in neighbouring markets, we  nd that 
the e ects are generally positive, as the number of 
shortage hours and the total cost to consumers are 
reduced in both zones.  e performance of the 
capacity market is hardly a ected by the presence 
of a strategic reserve in the neighbouring zone. Our 
research results not only indicate that the capacity 
market is a robust policy mechanism, but also that 
the strategic reserve in the neighbouring zone does 
not impact the capacity market negatively.  is is not 
surprising, as both capacity mechanisms were shown 
to have a positive spillover e ect on an energy-only 
market.  e presence of a strategic reserve in the 
interconnected zone does not impact capacity prices 
signi cantly.
In the zone with the strategic reserve, the import 
of electricity from the capacity market, along with 
the additional capacity available due to the strategic 
reserve, leads to a sharp reduction in shortages hours, 
a reduction of the price volatility and a decrease in 
the average electricity prices.  e exports from the 
capacity market reduce the need for a (large) stra-
tegic reserve. In the presence of the capacity market, 
the strategic reserve is no longer able to recover its 
costs. In this case, it appears that a smaller strategic 
reserve would su  ce. 
9. Conclusions & policy implications
We present an analysis of the cross-border e ects 
that may arise due to the implementation of capacity 
mechanisms in interconnected electricity markets 
with the use of an agent-based model. In the sce-
narios analysed in our research model, both capacity 
mechanisms improve the security of supply and 
contribute positively to consumer bene t in the two 
zones considered. 
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Interconnection with a neighbouring zone of equal 
size did not a ect the ability of a capacity market to 
reach its policy goals in our model, but this may have 
been due to the implementation of a large capacity 
reserve margin in our model. When a capacity 
market is implemented, a neighbouring market may 
experience a positive spillover and therefore free ride 
on the capacity market.  is may result in greater 
level of reliability and lower electricity prices in this 
neighbouring market. Free riding may increase the 
cost to the consumers in the capacity market, as they 
are paying for the additional adequacy.  e genera-
tors in the neighbouring energy-only zone may be 
crowded out, in some cases to the extent that an 
investment cycle develops. While this does not nec-
essarily a ect generation adequacy and prices in this 
zone negatively, policy makers may be uncomfort-
able with the resulting import dependence. 
Allowing generation companies in the zone without 
a capacity market to sell capacity credits in the 
capacity market may counter this e ect, as it will 
increase the value of generation capacity in the non-
capacity market. Another option is to implement a 
capacity mechanism in the neighbouring zone as 
well. Hence, the implementation of a capacity mech-
anism may cause pressure on neighbouring markets 
to do the same. 
A strategic reserve also has a positive spillover 
e ect on a neighbouring energy-only market, both 
regarding the reduction in shortage hours and cost 
to consumers. However, the presence of an energy-
only market in a neighbouring zone hurts the per-
formance of the strategic reserve with respect to the 
net cost to consumers and the number of shortage 
hours when compared to an isolated system with a 
strategic reserve. A strategic reserve can reduce the 
crowding-out e ect on its electricity market caused 
by the capacity market and thus lower the risk of 
investment cycles in generation capacity. However, 
in our research model, in the presence of the capacity 
market, a strategic reserve in an interconnected zone 
was unable to recover it costs. In this case, it appears 
that a smaller strategic reserve would su  ce.   
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